After studying what actually happened on wards the Nuffield team advocated better utility rooms, a treatment room for each ward, more sanitary facilities for the 70-90% of patients who might be ambulant, and more day space. They calculated that 20-25% of beds on a ward should be in single rooms-for patients who might infect others, patients susceptible to infection, seriously ill or dying patients, those likely to disturb others, and those needing special attention; some of these rooms should be central, with others at the edge of the ward. These guidelines have survived, and on wards designed today 20-25% of the beds are in single rooms.
The team designed two ward blocks-a 64 bed unit at Larkfield Hospital in Greenock and an 80 bed unit at Musgrave Park Hospital in Belfast-to try out its designs and experiment with team nursing. The Belfast ward had six bed bays, with beds set parallel to the walls-a form that has now become common, though the Nuffield team's suggestions on ward sizes have not been taken up. The English ward has settled down at about 28 beds for an acute ward (and slightly fewer for geriatric and children's wards), typically with four six bed bays and four single rooms.
Small bays permitted sexes and specialties to be mixed within the same ward, and flexibility in the use of wards was a major concern in ward design in the '60s and '70s. But the project team itself is cumbersome. In an organisation such as BUPA a small team of professional planners will draw up the brief-using DHSS guidance and its own standards-and will consult a group of selected future users; in practice most users tend to comment on equipment rather than layouts. In the NHS representatives of the users--doctors, nurses, administrators, and others-are expected to help actually construct the brief, in the early days with no standards and little guidance. The fact that they take time to learn the rules of the game and need time to consult with those they represent slows planning down. Because the users are doing other, full time jobs at the same time as they are planning, there may be no great cost in their taking a little longer, so long as they keep to a realistic timetable. There may be more scope in cutting down construction time by experimenting more with different types of contracts.
Tendering and building
Many schemes came unstuck when they went to tender. The DHSS always insisted that if tenders were for more than the budgeted cost the planners had to trim those costs. At worst-and this often happened-the necessary redesign had unforeseen repercussions elsewhere, it delayed the construction programme, and consequently it increased costs. At best the quality of the finishes was sacrificed, with long term repercussions on maintenance. The concern about costs at this level seems a little obsessive, because the capital cost of a hospital is exceeded by its running costs after about three years, and the cost of good finishes is often very small in relation to the whole and in relation to their value. Hospitals abroad do not stint on their finishes, and private hospitals know their value because their livelihood depends on it.
But the greatest problems arose from schemes going to tender with incomplete information. Only comparatively recently have engineering services been accurately costed and integrated with the interrelations of departments led to "peripheral banding" of wards. In these hospitals, and in many others built to a racetrack design, wards formed continuous strings around the outside of a building, with the bed bays on the outside, separated by a corridor housing the nurses' station from internal ancillary rooms and short corridors leading to main circulation routes.
The idea behind the linear form of these wards was progressive patient care: the beds closest to the nurses' station accommodated patients who needed the greatest supervision and were fully served by medical gases; further away the amount of immediate observation and servicing steadily diminished until, in the mark 1 best buy ward, there was an eight bed bay at the far end for low dependency patients. Very seriously ill patients were taken out of the ward altogether and concentrated in intensive care units.
The of bathrooms and toilets close to beds, with ancillary rooms close by to keep walking distances short.
In the nucleus acute adult ward, which comprises four six bedded bays and four single rooms, over half the beds can be easily seen from the nurses' station, but the elongated shape of the nucleus ward means that one bay is well removed from the nurses' base and that day rooms (shared between two wards) are some distance in the other direction. Dissatisfaction with the nucleus ward has prompted some regions to try their own solutions. The North Western region for example, has produced a geriatric ward-designed in a compact form so that it can be added on to existing hospitals-in which nearly all of the beds can be seen from the nurses' station. The South Western region also has a standard acute ward with high visibility, which is being used in hospitals built to nucleus briefs in Western super Mare and Cheltenham. Both of these plans, together with some sketch plans produced by members of the DHSS works group, which achieve over 80% visibility, meet the twin aims of visibility and compactness by "wrapping" the bays round three sides of a core formed by the nurses' station and ancillary rooms. architectural plans. Their costs used to be estimated and their positioning left till later-on site. These practices again led to increased costs, and worse. At Bangor Hospital in north Wales the waste pipes from the pathology department ended up running through the kitchens, and the positioning of ventilation equipment made the kitchen unworkable.' As a result of these problems-and of continual criticism about them from the Public Accounts Committee-the DHSS has simplified Capricode and tightened up regions' procedures on appraising, tendering for, and managing projects. One of the main goads was the debacle at Liverpool's teaching hospital (see box).
The Public Accounts Committee criticised the Liverpool hospital (and others of its type) for being constructionally suspect, expensive to build, hard to manage, and hard to modify.4 There was a certain irony in that the DHSS had itself eschewed that sort of development-for those sorts of reasons and promoted horizontal, low rise, easily flexible designs. It was no accident too that Liverpool was a teaching hospital under a board of governors. With no professional works staffs of their own, susceptible to the demands of powerful consultants, and with political influence through their direct relationship with the DHSS, boards of governors gave plenty of scope for mismanagement of large schemes.
Liverpool was lucky to get the chance to build two main phases at once. British hospitals have traditionally been built in phases, and most later phases have come a long time after the early ones; in some cases they have never appeared. So, although design guidance has always urged those planning hospitals to conceive them as a whole, rarely have they been built as a whole. In the time between phases practices, people, and needs change so that even if the later phases are actually built there is little chance of an architecturally coherent hospital.
The chances of building large hospitals in single phases are even less now. Apart from the presumption that nucleus sized hospitals are what is needed generally, the DHSS has told regions not to let contracts for more than three or four years. It is a sad comment on hospital building that one of the determinants of the size of a nucleus hospital-the need to keep building contracts shortresulted from the inability of now defunct authorities to manage longer contracts.
A new vernacular
While the Public Accounts Committee was criticising large hospitals of the Liverpool type for being constructionally suspect and hard to manage others were criticising them for being impersonal: "A hospital that relies entirely on telephones for communication and lifts for transport cannot be wholly successful."' They were criticising racetrack wards for needing more staff, flat Liverpool Royal Infirmary -Uk' I Liverpool is an extreme case but it illustrates many of the things that went wrong in the '60s and '70s. Phases II and III were started in 1968 and due for completion in 1974 at a cost of £11 8m. The contractor got into financial difficulties early on and the site was dogged by strikes and pay claims. In 1975 the contractor went out of business and first one then another contractor was brought in to finish it. There were extra costs for remedying defects, for increasing the content of the hospital, and for bringing it up to current regulations on energy use, the housing of animals, and-most important-fire safety. In 1976 the DHSS told the Public Accounts Committee that the final building, still not complete, would cost £54 19m much of it due to inflation. The hospital consisted of a two storey podium surmounted by a 12 storey ward block and five storey clinical block-a pattern typical of large hospitals in the '60s and still fairly typical abroad. Its problems with fire regulations arose partly from changes in the regulations in the eight or so years since it had been designed, but not entirely: the 41/2 acre podium roof was made of flammable material, and there was inadequate compartmentalisation and inadequate fire escapes.
roofs for leaking, and large areas of glass and internal rooms for consuming more energy.
Some of these criticisms are easy with hindsight, and they are not confined to hospitals. Hospitals are the latest in a whole range of buildings built in the '60s to suffer from failure through the use of high alumina cement. Similarly, current moves towards smaller buildings on a domestic scale and constructed with traditional materials and pitched roofs (as exemplified by some nucleus hospitals) are not confined to hospitals. These days factories, offices, and hospitals may all look like suburban semis.
Communications
Even if the brief is good, the design brilliant, and the construction sound a hospital will fail if its users do not use it as intended.
And this often happens because of a failure to communicate the brief-and its assumptions-to those commissioning the hospital. In 1955 the Nuffield study team said that proper timetabling in outpatient departments would remove the need for a large waiting area.6 Twenty two years later the waiting area in surgical outpatients at St Thomas's Hospital was being criticised for being too small because "the strict appointments system envisaged by the designers was never implemented."7 In tightly planned hospitals such as nucleus even minor changes in policy can create severe problems. Education centres shared between doctors and nurses work well in some hospitals, through cooperation and good timetabling; in others they do not. As part of the project to build a low energy hospital on the Isle of Wight a social psychologist has been appointed to help train the staff in energy conservation, because all the designed in equipment will be useless if it is not used properly.
A vested interest in denigration
In fact the record of health authorities in building hospitals is not as bad as it might seem to an insider. Planning and building are undoubtedly more disciplined now, but even in the '70s a report quoted to the Public Accounts Committee showed that among public building authorities the NHS, although its record on time overruns was poor, was fairly good in containing costs. The NHS was third best out of 10 for controlling costs, with 71% of its schemes within 5% of the contract sum. Hospitals also had a much lower rate of failure of construction than new houses, factories, or offices.
Some of the criticisms of English hospitals are accounted for by what Enoch Powell called a vested interest in denigration, but, looking back, critics might be forgiven for wondering whether England ever had a hospital policy. The patchwork of large teaching hospitals (expensive to run and in London at least possibly in the wrong places), other "unfinished" hospitals throughout the country, and now little nucleuses suggests a failure of nerve as much as of money. It is as if the NHS was never sure of what it wanted from a policy, it couldn't manage it, it couldn't pay for it, and now that it is capable of managing a building programme it hasn't got a policy.
What are the ideal criterta for emergency ventilatorslresuscitators, and do any of the machines on the market measure up to this ideal? Have any machines specific advantages over the others, particularly in relation to carrying and using them in physically awkward conditions. What are the advantagesldisadvantages of having a cylinder of air compared with carrying a cylinder of oxygen?
In most cases in which respiratory assistance is required the most urgent need is to clear the patient's airway. In this reply I have assumed that the questioner can recognise and relieve airway obstruction and that he does not intend to use any resuscitator/ventilator before undergoing the appropriate training. The minimum criteria for an "ideal" emergency ventilator are that it should be portable and compact; simple and with clear controls; reliable and safe; flexible enough to permit its use with patients of different ages and sizes; economical in its use of driving gas; able to deliver both 50% and 100% oxygen; and that it should have an audible failure alarm. At least four devices at present available meet many of these criteria (Blease, Drager, Penlon, Pneupac). The choice depends on the purchaser's specific needs. The only advantage of air over oxygen is that the former may be used in an environment in which fire or explosion presents a potential hazard. Air will not adequately oxygenate all patients who require resuscitation; most resuscitators have the facility to deliver either 100% oxygen or oxygen diluted with air, and this is adequate for any emergency need.-j C STODDART, consultant in charge, intensive therapy unit, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Corrections
Can we have safer cigarettes?
In error in this paper by Tessa Richards (17 November, p 1374) it was not mentioned that the meeting was initiated and sponsored by the Chest, Heart and Stroke Association.
Medicolegal: Dr Gee v the BBC and two doctors
We regret that errors have occurred in our two previous reports on this case (17 November, p 1386; 24 November, p 1460). The doses of tri-iodothyronine and thyroxine should have been in sg not mg.
